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ABSTRACT
We study optimal monetary policy in an economy with nominal private debt, borrowing constraints
and price rigidity. Private debt reflects equilibrium trade between an impatient borrower, who faces
an endogenous collateral constraint, and a patient saver, who engages in consumption smoothing.
Since inflation can positively affect borrower's net worth, monetary policy optimally balances the
incentive to offset the price stickiness distortion with the one of marginally relaxing the borrower's
collateral constraint. We find that the optimal volatility of inflation is increasing in three key
parameters:  (i)  the  borrower's  weight  in  the  planner's  objective  function;  (ii)  the  borrower's
impatience rate; (iii) the degree of price flexibility. In general, however, deviations from price
stability are small for a small degree of price stickiness. In a two-sector version of our model, in
which durable price movements can directly affect the ability of borrowing, the optimal volatility
of (non-durable) inflation is more sizeable. In our context, and relative to simple Taylor rules, the







tommaso.monacelli@unibocconi.it"Debt leverage of all types is often troublesome when one judges the stability
o ft h ee c o n o m y .S h o u l dh o m ep r i c e sf a l l ,w ew o u l dh a v er e a s o nt ob ec o n c e r n e d
about mortgage debt".1
1 Introduction
The sizeable increase in house prices combined with an unprecedented rise in household
debt have been among the most important facts observed in several OECD countries in
the last decade. In addition, the two facts are usually perceived as mutually reinforcing.
T h er i s ei nh o u s ep r i c e sh a si n d u c e dh o u s e h o l d st oi n c r e a s i n g l ye x t r a c te q u i t yf r o mt h e i r
accumulated assets thereby encouraging further borrowing against the realized capital
gains. Dynamics of this sort have been considered important in sustaining the level
of private spending in several countries, especially during the business cycle downturn
of 2001. Figure 1 displays the dynamics of total private consumption and household
mortgage debt in the US. Figure 2 displays the joint behavior of private consumption
and of (an harmonized index of) house prices. It is clear that these three variables display
as i g n i ﬁcant degree of comovement at the business cycle frequency.
L a r g ep a r to ft h eo b s e r v e di n c r e a s ei nh o u s e h o l db o r r o w i n gh a sb e e ni nt h ef o r mo f
collateralized debt. Hence the role of durable goods - especially housing - as an instru-
ment of collateralization has also increased over time. Figure 3 displays the evolution
of mortgage debt (as a prototype form of secured debt) as a share of total outstanding
household debt. This share has increased from about 60% in 1952 to about 75% in 2005.
If one were to consider also vehicles loans, the share of collateralized debt in the U.S.
would rise to about 90%.2
While developments in the housing sector and institutional features in mortgage mar-
kets (e.g., prevalence of ﬁxed vs. variable mortgage contracts, importance of equity with-
1Former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan’s remarks at America’s Community Bankers
Annual Convention, Washington, D.C., October 19, 2004.
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Figure 1: Consumption and Mortgage Debt
drawal, down-payment and reﬁnancing rates) have become common vocabulary for mon-
etary policymakers around the world, the same issues have received very scant attention
in the recent normative analysis of monetary policy.
The monetary policy literature has soared in the last few years within the framework
of the so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS). The NNS builds on microfounded
models with imperfect competition and nominal rigidities, and has currently emerged as a
workhorse paradigm for the normative analysis of monetary policy.3 However, in the NNS,
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy remains limited to a typical real interest
rate channel on aggregate demand. The latter channel ignores issues related to credit
market imperfections, wealth eﬀects linked to the evolution of asset prices, households’
heterogeneity in saving rates and determinants of collateralized debt.
Principles of optimal monetary policy within the NNS revolve around the polar star of
price stability.4 Consider the basic eﬃciency argument for price stability. Suppose, for the
3See, among many others, Goodfriend and King (1997), Woodford (2003), Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(1999), King and Wolman (1999), Khan et al. (2003).
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Figure 3: Mortgage Debt as a Share of Total Outstanding Household Debt.
3sake of exposition, that the economy experiences a positive productivity shock and that
prices are completely rigid. Firms are constrained to comply with demand at that given
price. Hence they react by raising markups and reducing labor demand. The stickiness of
prices generates room for a procyclical monetary intervention to boost aggregate demand
in line with the higher desired production. In turn this validates the strict stability of
prices as an equilibrium choice by ﬁrms. In practice, this monetary policy intervention
manages in eliminating the distortion induced by price stickiness.
Matters are diﬀerent in our framework, characterized by two main features. First,
households display heterogenous patience rates and therefore diﬀerent marginal utilities
o fc o n s u m p t i o n( s a v i n g ) .S e c o n d ,t h em o r ei m p a t i e n ta g e n t sf a c eac o l l a t e r a lc o n s t r a i n to n
nominal borrowing. Both elements constitute a deviation from the standard representative
agent model with free borrowing which is typical of the NNS. In that framework, by
construction, debt is always zero in equilibrium.
To understand why these features may alter the baseline normative implication of
price stability that emerges in the NNS, we emphasize two distinct dimensions. First, the
role of nominal private debt per se. Second, the role of durable prices in aﬀecting the
ability of borrowing by endogenously altering the value of the assets that act as collateral.
C o n s i d e rt h er o l eo fd e b tﬁrst. If debt contracts are predetermined in nominal terms,
inﬂation can directly aﬀect household’s net worth by reducing the real value of outstand-
ing debt service. Thus inﬂation can have redistributive eﬀects (from savers to borrowers).
The key issue, then, is the extent to which a Ramsey-optimal policy would like to resort
to this redistributive margin in equilibrium. Once again, consider a temporary rise in
productivity. A constrained household (the borrower), whose marginal utility of current
consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving, would like to increase spending, and
do so disproportionately more than an unconstrained agent (the saver), who engages in
consumption smoothing. At the same time, in a model with collateral requirements, the
borrower faces a wealth eﬀect on labor supply. In fact, in order to sustain the surge in
deviating from the price stability paradigm can be consistent with eﬃciency. See Woodford (2003) for a
complete analysis.
4consumption, the borrower needs to optimally balance the purchasing of new debt with
an increase in labor supply required to ﬁnance new collateral. The tighter the borrowing
constraint, the more stringent the necessity of increasing labor supply. Importantly, mon-
etary policy can exert an inﬂuence on this margin. By generating inﬂation, the monetary
authority can positively aﬀect borrower’s net worth, thereby allowing the constrained
household to increase consumption for any given level of work eﬀort.
Thus the presence of nominal debt per se may constitute a motivation for deviating
from a price stability prescription. In fact, and already previewing some of our key
results, our analysis indicates that the optimal volatility of inﬂation is increasing in two
parameters symbolizing heterogeneity: (i) the borrower’s weight in the planner’s objective
function; (ii) the borrower’s impatience rate (relative to the saver).
However, and due to the presence of price stickiness, inﬂation variability is costly.
Hence monetary policy will have to optimally balance the incentive to oﬀset the price
stickiness distortion with the one of marginally aﬀecting borrower’s collateral constraint.
Our results point out that, quantitatively, the incentive to oﬀset the price stickiness dis-
tortion is predominant and that, already for a small degree of price stickiness, equilibrium
deviations from price stability are small.5
Next consider the role of durable (asset) prices. In a way similar to the credit cycle
eﬀects exposed in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), movements in the
real price of durables endogenously aﬀect the borrowing limit and in turn consumption.
The mechanism is simple. A rise in price of durables induces, ceteris paribus, a fall in the
marginal value of borrowing (i.e., a softening of the borrowing constraint). This implies,
for the borrower, a fall in the marginal utility of current (non-durable) consumption
relative to the option of shifting consumption intertemporally (in other words, a violation
of the Euler equation), which can be validated only by a rise in current consumption. In
5In this context with incomplete markets (in fact, one-period nominal debt is the only traded asset),
there is an even more fundamental motive for inﬂation volatility, namely the incentive of the planner to
"complete the markets", by rendering nominal debt state contingent. This motive, however, is strictly
intertwined with the redistributive motive we emphasize here. In fact, no debt would be traded in the
absence of heterogeneity, which in turn is the essential feature justifying redistribution.
5turn, the increased demand for borrowing further stimulates the demand for durables and
its relative price, inducing a cycle eﬀe c tt h a tf u r t h e rb o o s t s( n o n - d u r a b l e )s p e n d i n g .
In an eﬃcient equilibrium with free borrowing and lending, the borrower would indeed
like (given his impatience) to expand borrowing to ﬁnance current consumption. Yet
he/she would do so without resorting to an increase in demand for durables. Hence
collateral limits per se induce ineﬃcient movements in the relative price of durables. On
the other hand, though, a strict stabilization of durable prices is largely detrimental for
the borrower and would be inconsistent with the need of realizing sectoral relative price
movements. As a result, the optimal policy balances the incentive to partially stabilize
relative durable prices with the one of oﬀsetting the stickiness in non-durable prices. In
fact, in our simulations, a Ramsey-type policy emerges as an intermediate case between
two extreme forms of Taylor-type interest rate rules: a rule that strictly stabilizes non-
durable price inﬂation and a rule that strictly stabilizes the relative price of durables.
The existing literature related to this paper originates from the seminal work of
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) (BG henceforth), who emphasize the role of collateral re-
quirements in aﬀecting aggregate ﬂuctuations. In BG, collateral constraints are motivated
by the presence of private information and limited liability. More recently, Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) (KM henceforth) build a general equilibrium model in which two categories
of agents (borrowers and savers) trade private debt. Heterogeneity is introduced in the
form of diﬀerent patience rates. In KM, collateral requirements are motivated by the
presence of limited enforcement, in a way similar to the approach followed here. Both BG
and KM, despite some diﬀerences, share the central implication that the wealth of the
borrower inﬂuences private spending. Iacoviello (2005) extends the work of KM to build
a bridge with the recent New Keynesian monetary policy framework. In his analysis, the
role of nominal debt and asset prices are central for the propagation of monetary policy
shocks, but no normative aspect is analyzed. Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) analyze the
implications for macroeconomic volatility of the relaxation of collateral requirements in
the US (dated around 1980) in a general equilibrium environment. However, their real
business cycle framework is not suitable for a study of monetary policy, and it abstracts
6from any role of asset prices. Recently, Erceg and Levin (2005) study optimal monetary
policy in an economy with two sectors (durable and non durables) and similar to the
one employed here. Their analysis, though, abstracts from any form of credit market
imperfection.
2 The Model
The model builds on Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and Hercowitz (2005). The economy
is composed of two types of households, borrowers and savers, and two sectors - produc-
ing durable and non durable goods respectively - each populated by a large number of
monopolistic competitive ﬁrms and by a perfectly competitive ﬁnal goods producer. The
borrowers diﬀer from the savers in that they exhibit a lower patience rate and therefore
ah i g h e rp r o p e n s i t yt oc o n s u m e . 6 Complementary to this assumption is the one that the
borrowers face a collateral constraint. In fact, if agents were free to borrow and lend at the
market interest rate, the borrowers would exhibit a tendency to accumulate debt indeﬁ-
nitely, rendering the steady state of the economy indeterminate. Peculiar to the borrowers
is that their preferences are tilted towards current consumption. Formally, their marginal
utility of current consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving. As a result, in the
face of a temporary positive shock to income, they do not act as consumption smoothers
but tend instead to reduce saving. In this vein, the presence of household debt reﬂects
equilibrium intertemporal trading between the two types of agents, with the savers acting
as standard consumption-smoothers.7
6For early general equilibrium models with heterogenous impatience rates, see Becker (1980), Woodford
(1986), Becker and Foias (1987), Krusell and Smith (1989). More recently, see Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2005). Here we use the categories borrower/saver
as synonimous of impatient and patient household respectively. Notice, however, that the fact that the
relatively more impatient (patient) agent emerges as a borrower (saver) is an equilibrium phenomenon.
7Galí et al. (2006) also construct a model in which agents are heterogenous along the consumption-
smoothing dimension, and use it to analyze the eﬀects of government spending shocks. In their framework,
the non-smoothers are agents which are completely excluded from the possibility of borrowing (follow-
ing Campbell and Mankiw (1989) those agents are named rule-of-thumb consumers). Hence, in that
framework, private debt cannot emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon.
72.1 Final Good Producers
In each sector (j = c,d) a perfectly competitive ﬁnal good producer purchases Yj,t(i)












where Yj,t(i) is quantity demanded of the intermediate good i by ﬁnal good producer
j,a n dεj is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated varieties in sector j.
Notice, in particular, that in the durable good sector Yd,t(i) refers to expenditure in the
new durable intermediate good i (rather than services). Maximization of proﬁts yields






Yj,t j = c,d (2)




1−εj is the price index consistent with the
ﬁnal good producer in sector j e a r n i n gz e r op r o ﬁts.8
2.2 Borrowers/Workers
The representative borrower consumes an index of consumption services of durable and















where Ct denotes consumption services of the ﬁnal non-durable good, Dt denotes services
from the stock of the ﬁnal durable good at the end of period t, α is the share of durable
goods in the composite consumption index and η ≥ 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between services of non-durable and durable goods. In the case η → 0 non-durable
8Hence the problem of the ﬁnal good producer j is: max Pj,tYj,t −
R 1
0 Pj,t(i)Yj,t(i)di subject to (1).
8consumption and durable services are perfect complements, whereas if η →∞the two
services are perfect substitutes.









subject to the sequence of budget constraints (in nominal terms):
Pc,t Ct + Pd,t(Dt − (1 − δ)Dt−1)+Rt−1Bt−1 ≤ Bt + WtNt + Tt (5)
where Bt is end-of-period t nominal debt, and Rt−1 is the nominal lending rate on loan
contracts stipulated at time t − 1.F u r t h e r m o r e , Wt is the nominal wage, Nt is labor
supply and Tt are net government transfers. Labor is assumed to be perfectly mobile
across sectors, implying that the nominal wage rate is common across sectors.
In real terms (units of non-durable consumption), (5) reads:












Pc,t is the relative price of the durable good, and bt ≡ Bt
Pc,t is real debt. The
left hand side of (6) denotes uses of funds (durable and non-durable spending plus real
debt service), while the right hand side denotes available resources (new debt, real labor
income and transfers). An important feature of (6), which follows from debt contracts
being predetermined in nominal terms, is that (non-durable) inﬂation can aﬀect borrower’s
net worth. Hence, for given outstanding debt, a rise in inﬂation lowers the current real
burden of debt repayments.
Later we will work with the following speciﬁcation of the utility function






where ϕ is the inverse elasticity of labor supply and v is a scale parameter.9
9Notice that we abstract from an explicit role for money. Along the lines of Woodford (2003, chp. 2),
9Collateral Constraint Private borrowing is subject to a limit. We assume that the
whole stock of debt is collateralized. The borrowing limit is tied to the value of the
durable good stock:
Bt ≤ (1 − χ)DtPd,t (7)
where χ i st h ef r a c t i o no ft h ed u r a b l es t o c kv a l u et h a tc a n n o tb eu s e da sac o l l a t e r a l .
In general, one can broadly think of χ as the down payment rate, or the inverse of the
loan-to-value ratio, and therefore an indirect measure of the tightness of the borrowing
constraint.10 Jappelli and Pagano (1989) provide evidence on the presence of liquidity
constrained agents by linking their share to more structural features of the credit markets.
In particular, they ﬁnd that the share of liquidity constrained agents is larger in countries
in which a measure of the loan-to-value ratio is lower.11
Notice that movements in the durable good price directly aﬀect the ability of bor-
rowing. It is widely believed that the recent rise in house prices in the US has induced
households to increasingly extract equity from their accumulated assets thereby encour-
aging further borrowing against their realized capital gains. This link between asset price
ﬂuctuations and ability of borrowing has presumably played an important role in deter-
mining households’ spending patterns during the recent business cycle evolution.12
one can think of the present economy as a cashless limit of a money-in-the-utllity model, in which the
weight of real money balances in utility is negligible. Our maintained assumption is that the monetary
authority can directly control the short-run nominal interest rate. This allows us to abstract from any
monetary transaction friction driving the optimal policy prescription towards the Friedman rule.
10Notice, though, that χ =0does not correspond to a situation in which the borrowing contraint
is absent. That situation would obtain only in the case in which heterogeneity in patience rates were
assumed away. See more on this point below.
11The form of the collateral constraint has been deliberately kep simple to facilitate the analysis.
However, there are at least two important dimensions that are neglected here. First, incorporating an
explicit mortgage reﬁnancing choice. In the US, in the last few years, the ability of extract equity has
worked primarily through reﬁnancing decisions linked to the downward trend in nominal interest rates.
Second, a distinction betwee ﬁxed and variable rate mortgage contracts. For a positive analysis of these
issues see Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2006).
12For instance, Alan Greenspan’s view is summarized by the following excerpt: "Among the factors
contributing to the strength of spending and the decline in saving have been developments in housing
10We assume that, in a neighborhood of the deterministic steady state, equation (5)
is always satisﬁed with equality.13 We can then rewrite the collateral constraint in real
terms (i.e., in units of non-durable consumption) as follows:
bt =( 1− χ) qtDt (8)
Given {b−1, D−1}, the borrower chooses {Nt,b t, Dt,C t} to maximize (4) subject to
(6) and (8). By deﬁning λt and λtψt as the multipliers on constraints (6) and (8) re-








Uc,t = λt (10)









Equations (9) and (10) are standard. Respectively, they state that the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure is equalized to the real wage (in units
of ND consumption) and that the marginal utility of income is equalized to the marginal
utility of consumption. Equation (11) is an intertemporal condition on durable demand. It
markets and home ﬁnance that have spurred rising household wealth and allowed greater access to that
wealth. The rapid rise in home prices over the past several years has provided households with considerable
capital gains (...)" (Congress Testimony, February 2005).
13This assumption is obviously not uncontroversial. Ideally one would like a model in which the
borrowers may be free to choose to hit the borrowing limit only occasionally. Hence our assumption
remains valid only to the extent that we consider small ﬂuctuations around the relevant deterministic
steady state (see more on this below), so that standard log-linearization techniques may still be applied.
This can be assured by specifying disturbance processes of suﬃciently small amplitude.
11requires the borrower to equate the marginal utility of current (non-durable) consumption
to the marginal gain of durable services. The latter depends on three components: i) the
direct utility gain of an additional unit of durable Ud,t; ii) the expected utility stemming
from the possibility of expanding future consumption by means of the realized resale value
of the durable purchased in the previous period, β(1−δ)Et {Uc,t+1qt+1}; iii) the marginal
utility of relaxing the borrowing constraint Uc,t(1 − χ) ψtqt. Notice that, in the absence
of borrowing constraints (i.e., ψt =0 ), the latter component drops out. Intuitively, if ψt
rises the borrowing constraint binds more tightly (i.e., the marginal gain of relaxing the
constraint is larger) and therefore the marginal gain of acquiring an additional unit of
durable (which, once used as collateral, allows to expand borrowing) is higher.
The interpretation of ψt is more transparent from equation (12), which is a modiﬁed
version of an Euler consumption condition. Indeed it reduces to a standard intertemporal
condition in the case of ψt =0for all t. Alternatively, it has the interpretation of an asset
price condition. In fact, the marginal value of additional borrowing (the left hand side
ψt)i st i e dt oap a y o ﬀ (right hand side) that captures the deviation from a standard Euler
equation. Consider, for the sake of argument, ψt rising from zero to a positive value.






. In other words, the marginal
utility of current consumption exceeds the marginal utility of saving, i.e., the marginal
gain of shifting one unit of consumption intertemporally. The higher ψt, the higher the
net marginal beneﬁt of purchasing the durable asset, which allows, by marginally relaxing
the borrowing constraint, to purchase additional current consumption.
2.3 Savers
The economy is composed of a second category of consumers, labeled savers. They diﬀer
f r o mt h eb o r r o w e r si nt h ef a c tt h a tt h e yh a v eahigher patience rate. In addition, we
assume that the representative saver is the owner of the monopolistic ﬁrms in each sector.






t e U(e Ct, e Dt)
)
(13)
Importantly, preferences are such that the saver discounts the future more heavily than
the borrower, hence γ>β . The saver’s sequence of budget constraints reads (in nominal
terms):
Pc,t e Ct + Pd,t
³
e Dt − (1 − δ)e Dt−1
´




where e Ct is saver’s non-durable consumption, e Dt is the saver’s utility services from the
stock of durable goods, e Bt is end-of-period t nominal debt (credit), e Tt are net government
transfers and e Γj,t are nominal proﬁts from the holding of monopolistic competitive ﬁrms
in sector j.
The eﬃciency conditions for this program are a standard Euler equation:







and a durable demand condition (in the absence of borrowing constraints)





In this case, being a permanent-income consumer, the saver will equate the marginal
rate of substitution between durable and non-durable consumption exactly to the standard
user cost expression prevailing in the absence of borrowing constraints.
2.4 Production and Pricing of Intermediate Goods
A typical intermediate good ﬁrm i in sector j hires labor (supplied by the borrowers) to
operate a linear production function:
Yj,t(i)=Aj,tNj,t(i) (17)
13where Aj,t is a productivity shifter common to all ﬁrms in sector j.E a c h ﬁrm i has
monopolistic power in the production of its own variety and therefore has leverage in







,w h e r e
the parameter ϑj measures the degree of sectoral nominal price rigidity. The higher ϑj
t h em o r es l u g g i s hi st h ea d j u s t m e n to fn o m i n a lp r i c e si ns e c t o rj. In the particular case
of ϑj =0 ,p r i c e sa r eﬂexible.
The problem of each monopolistic ﬁrm is to choose the sequence {Nj,t(i),P j,t(i)}
∞
t=0 in























is the saver’s stochastic discount factor and e λt
is the saver’s marginal utility of nominal income. Let’s denote by
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t t h er e l a t i v ep r i c e
of variety i in sector j.I nasymmetric equilibrium in which
Pj,t(i)
Pj,t =1for all i and j,a n d
all ﬁrms employ the same amount of labor in each sector, the ﬁrst order condition of the
above problem reads:

















is the real marginal cost in sector j. Recall that, due to labor being perfectly mobile, the
n o m i n a lw a g ei sc o m m o na c r o s ss e c t o r s .
Rearranging equation (19) one can obtain the following sector-speciﬁc price setting
constraint, assuming the form of a forward-looking Phillips curve














































t (if j = d) (23)
Equation (21) constraints the evolution of sectoral prices when the price setting problem
is inherently dynamic as in (18). It has the form of a so-called New Keynesian Phillips
c u r v ei nt h a tc u r r e n ti n ﬂation depends on future expected inﬂation and on the deviation
of the real marginal cost from its ﬂexible-price constant value. An equation such as (21)
is a fundamental building block of the recent stream of models of the NNS.14
I nt h ep a r t i c u l a rc a s eo fﬂexible prices t h er e a lm a r g i n a lc o s tm u s tb ec o n s t a n ta n d
equal to the inverse steady state markup
εj−1
εj ,f o rj = c, d. Notice that, in the durable
sector, variations in the relative price of durables (possibly due to sectoral asymmetric
shocks) drive a wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure on the one hand and the marginal product of labor on the other. Hence the
real marginal cost is directly aﬀected by movements in the relative price. This aspect is
important because it points to a typical ineﬃciency that constraints monetary policy in
models with two sectors. Namely, in the presence of sectoral asymmetric disturbances, if
14See Gaòo and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003).
15prices in either sector are sticky, simultaneous stabilization of real marginal costs in both
sectors becomes unfeasible. In fact, asymmetric shocks will necessarily require equilibrium
movements in the relative price.
2.5 Market Clearing
Equilibrium in the goods market of sector j requires that the production of the ﬁnal good
be allocated to expenditure and to resource costs originating from the adjustment of prices










Equilibrium in the debt and labor market requires respectively:
Bt + e Bt =0 (26)
X
j
Nj,t = Nt (27)
2.6 Equilibrium
For any speciﬁed policy process {Rt} and exogenous state vector {Ac,t, Ad,t},a n( i m p e r -
fectly) competitive allocation is a sequence for
n
Nt,N c,t,N d,t,b t,D t, e Dt,C t, e Ct,πc,t,πd,t,ψt,q t
o
satisfying (6) and (8) with equality, (9)-(12), (15), (16), (21), (24), (25), (27).
3 Steady State of the Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the features of the deterministic steady state associated to
the competitive equilibrium. We emphasize two results. First, the borrower is always
constrained in the steady state (and hence will remain such forever). This is assured by
the assumption that the borrower is more impatient than the saver, hence the marginal
16utility of saving of the former is lower than the one of latter. Second, the steady state
l e v e lo fd e b ti su n i q u ea n dp o s i t i v e . I ti sag e n e r a lr e s u l to fm o d e l sw i t hh e t e r o g e n o u s
discount rates and borrowing constraints that the patient agent will end-up owning all
available assets. This has been pointed out in earlier work by Becker (1980) and Becker
and Foias (1987). In the context of our framework, this translates into the borrower
holding a positive amount of debt in steady state.
We proceed as follows. In the steady state, the saver’s discount rate pins down the
real rate of return. Hence by combining the steady state version of (15), which implies
R = πc





where πc is the steady state rate of inﬂation in non-durables. Notice that β = γ implies
ψ =0 . In other words, absence of heterogeneity entails that the borrowing constraint
does not bind. That would correspond to the standard scenario in a representative agent
economy.







where RR is the steady state real interest rate. Hence, the borrower’s discount rate
exceeds the steady state real interest rate.
In a ﬂexible price steady state for both sectors, taking the ratio of (22) and (23) the







Assuming equal price elasticity of demand in both sectors (εd = εc),w eh a v eq =1 .B y
evaluating (11) in the steady state (and given our preference speciﬁc a t i o n )w eo b t a i nt h e






[1 − β(1 − δ) − (1 − χ)ψ]
−η (31)
Notice that the relative demand for durables is increasing in the shadow value of bor-
rowing ψ. Intuitively, acquiring more durables allows to marginally relax the borrowing
constraint.
The steady state leverage ratio, deﬁned as the ratio between steady state debt and
durable assets owned, can be written:
b
D
=( 1− χ) (32)
T op i nd o w nt h el e v e lo fd e b tw ep r o c e e da sf o l l o w s .W es e tp a r a m e t e rv in order to set






where µc ≡ εc





[1 − β (1 − δ) − ψ(1 − χ)]
η + δ +
(1 − γ)(1− χ)
γ
¾
Once obtained D from (33), it is straightforward, using (32), to solve for the unique level of
borrower’s debt in the steady state. This steady state level of debt would be indeterminate
in the special case in which agents did not exhibit heterogeneity in preference rates (see
Becker (1980)).
4 Optimal Monetary Policy
Having laid out our framework, we next proceed to study the optimal conduct of monetary
policy. The optimal monetary policy literature in the context of DSGE models with
15In particular, we will require that the borrower devotes to work one third of the time unit.
18nominal rigidities has soared in the last few years.16 However, these developments have
neglected a number of features that are central to the present analysis: (i) the presence
of nominal private debt and heterogeneity; (ii) the role of collateral constraints and (iii)
t h er o l eo fd u r a b l ep r i c e si na ﬀecting the ability of borrowing endogenously.
4.0.1 The Ramsey Problem
We assume that ex-ante commitment is feasible. In the classic approach to the study of
optimal policy in dynamic economies (Ramsey (1927), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Lucas
and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991)), and in a typical public ﬁnance
spirit, a Ramsey planner maximizes household’s welfare subject to a resource constraint,
to the constraints describing the equilibrium in the private sector economy, and via an
explicit consideration of all the distortions that characterize both the long-run and the
cyclical behavior of the economy.
Recently there has been a resurgence of interest for a Ramsey-type approach in dy-
namic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities. Khan et al. (2003) analyze
optimal monetary policy in an economy where the relevant distortions are imperfect com-
petition, staggered price setting and monetary transaction frictions. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004) focus on the joint optimal determination of monetary and
ﬁscal policy. However, the issue of optimal policy in the face of households’ credit con-
straints has been largely neglected.
A point of particular concern in deﬁning the planner’s problem in an economy with
heterogeneity is the speciﬁcation of the relevant objective function. Let’s deﬁne by ω the
weight assigned to saver’s utility in the planner’s objective function. Then we assume
that the planner maximizes the following weighted utility functional:
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´
(34)
The Ramsey problem under commitment can be described as follows. Let {λk,t}
∞
t=0
16To name a few, Adao et al. (2003), Khan et al. (2003), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), Woodford
(2003), King and Wolman (1999), Clarida et al. (1999), Benigno and Woodford (2005).
19(k =1 ,2,..) represent sequences of Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (6), (8), (9)-
(12), (15), (16), (21), (24), (25), (27) respectively. For given stochastic processes {Ac,t,
Ac,t}∞
t=0, plans for the control variables
n




and for the costate variables {λk,t}
∞
t=0 represent a ﬁrst-best constrained allocation if they
solve the following maximization problem:
max E0 {W0} (35)
subject to (6), (8), (9)-(12), (15), (16), (21), (24), (25), (27).
(Non-)Recursivity and Solution Approach As a result of (some of) the constraints
in problem (35) exhibiting future expectations of control variables, the maximization
problem as spelled out in (35) is intrinsically non-recursive.17 As ﬁrst emphasized in
Kydland and Prescott (1980), and then developed by Marcet and Marimon (1999), a
formal way to rewrite the same problem in a recursive stationary form is to enlarge the
planner’s state space with additional (pseudo) costate variables. Such variables bear the
crucial meaning of tracking, along the dynamics, the value to the planner of committing
to the pre-announced policy plan. In Appendix B and C we show how to formulate the
optimal plan in an equivalent recursive lagrangian form.
We then proceed in the following way. First, we compute the stationary allocations
that characterize the deterministic steady state of the eﬃciency conditions of problem
(35) for t>0. We label this as deterministic Ramsey steady state. We then compute
a log-linear approximation of the respective policy functions in the neighborhood of the
Ramsey steady state.
The spirit of this exercise deserves some further comments. In concentrating on the
(log-linear) dynamics in the neighborhood of the Ramsey steady state we are in practice
implicitly assuming that the economy has been evolving and policy been conducted around
such a steady state for a long period of time. Technically speaking, this amounts to
17See Kydland and Prescott (1980). As such the system does not satisfy per se the principle of
optimality, according to which the optimal decision at time t is a time invariant function only of a small
set of state variables.
20assuming that the initial values of the lagged multipliers involved in problem (35) are set
equal to their initial steady state values. Khan et al. (2003) apply this strategy to an
optimal monetary policy problem in a closed economy. Under certain conditions, one can
show that this approach is equivalent to evaluating policy as invariant from a "timeless
perspective", as described in Woodford (2003) and Benigno and Woodford (2005).
4.1 Calibration
In this section we describe our benchmark parameterization of the model. This will be
useful for the quantitative analysis conducted below. We set the saver’s and borrower’s
discount factors respectively to γ =0 .99 and β =0 .98.T h i si m p l i e sa na n n u a lr e a li n t e r e s t






Throughout we are going to assume that the Ramsey planner sets the preference weight
ω = 1
2, although we will report sensitivity results on the value of this parameter.
We wish to work under the assumption that all outstanding debt is collateralized
(hence we ignore the role of unsecured debt, e.g., credit cards) and that durables are long-
lived. Thus, in this context, durables mainly capture the role of housing. The depreciation
rate for houses is much lower than the one usually assumed for physical capital, and is
comprised between 1.5% and 3% per year. Since our model is parameterized on a quarterly
basis, we set δ =0 .025ˆ(1/4).
The annual average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio on home mortgages is roughly 0.75.T h i s
is the average value over the 1952-2005 period. This number has increased over time, as
a consequence of ﬁnancial liberalization, from about 72% at the beginning of the sample
to a peak of 78% around the year 2000. The same parameter is only slightly higher when
considering mortgages on new houses.18 Hence we set the LTV ratio as (1 − χ)=0 .75,
which yields χ =0 .25.
The share of durable consumption in the aggregate spending index, deﬁned by α,i ss e t
in such a way that δ(D+ e D), the steady state share of durable spending in total spending,
is 0.2. This number is consistent with the combined share of durable consumption and
18The source for these numbers is the Federal Housing Finance Board, http://www.fhfb.gov.
21residential investment in the NIPA Tables. The elasticity of substitution between varieties
in the non-durable sector εc is set equal to 8, which yields a steady state mark-up of about
15%. As a benchmark case, we set the elasticity of substitution between durable and non-
durable consumption η =1 , implying a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation of the consumption
aggregator (3).
In order to parameterize the degree of price stickiness in non-durables, we observe
that, by log-linearizing equation (21) around a zero-inﬂation steady state, we can obtain
an elasticity of inﬂation to real marginal cost (normalized by the steady state level of
output)19 that takes the form εc−1
ϑ . This allows a direct comparison with empirical studies
on the New Keynesian Phillips curve such as Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone
(2002) using a Calvo-Yun approach. In those studies, the slope coeﬃcient of the log-
linear Phillips curve can be expressed as
(1−e ϑ)(1−βe ϑ)
e ϑ ,w h e r eb ϑ is the probability of not
resetting the price in any given period in the Calvo-Yun model. For any given values
of εc, which entails a choice on the steady state level of the markup, we can thus build
a mapping between the frequency of price adjustment in the Calvo-Yun model 1
1−e ϑ and
t h ed e g r e eo fp r i c es t i c k i n e s sϑ in the Rotemberg setup. Traditionally, the sticky price
literature has been considering a frequency of four quarters as a realistic value. Recently,
Bils and Klenow (2004) argue that the observed frequency of price adjustment in the
U.S. is higher, and in the order of two quarters. As a benchmark, we parameterize
1
1−e ϑ =4 , which implies b ϑ =0 .75.G i v e nεc =8 , the resulting stickiness parameter satisﬁes
ϑ =
Y e ϑ (ε−1)
(1−e ϑ)(1−βe ϑ) ∼ 17.5,w h e r eY is steady state output. In general, however, we will
conduct sensitivity experiments on the role of non-durable price stickiness.
A critical issue concerns the assumed degree of price stickiness in durables.T h ec o m -
prehensive study by Bils and Klenow (2004) does not report any direct evidence on the
degree of stickiness of long-lived durables, and housing in particular. It may appear rea-
sonable to assume that house prices are in general more ﬂexible than non-durable goods
prices. Barski et al. (2005) argue that sales prices of new houses are ﬂexible. One reason
19T op r o d u c eas l o p ec o e ﬃcient directly comparable to the empirical literature on the New Keynesian
Phillips curve this elasticity needs to be normalized by the level of output when the price adjustment
cost factor is not explicitly proportional to output, as assumed here.
22may be that, since the price of new houses can be negotiated, the role of ﬁxed components
such as menu costs can be more easily neutralized. In addition, Figure 2 shows that house
prices feature a pronounced business cycle component.
To simplify matters we will then work under the extreme assumption that durable
prices are ﬂexible. This assumption is not immaterial. Barski et al. (2005) argue that
the assumption of ﬂexible durable prices dramatically aﬀect the ability of standard sticky
price models to reproduce the empirical eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on durable and
non-durable spending. In particular, if durable prices are ﬂexible, and against the ob-
served VAR-based evidence, durable spending contracts during expansions. In addition,
and regardless of the assumed degree of stickiness in non-durables, ﬂexible durable prices
tend to impart a form of neutrality to policy shocks to the entire economy. However, in
Monacelli (2005) we argue that the introduction of borrowing constraints and the con-
sideration of durables as collateral assets help in reconciling the model with the observed
empirical evidence. In this vein, borrowing constraints act as a substitute of nominal
rigidity in durable prices. In an extreme case, when also non-durable prices are assumed
to be ﬂexible, borrowing constraints can even partially act as a substitute of nominal
rigidity altogether in generating non-neutral eﬀects of monetary policy.
Table 1 summarizes the details of our baseline calibration:
Table 1. Baseline Calibration
Parameter Description Value
β borrower’s discount rate 0.98
γ saver’s discount rate 0.99
δ durable depreciation rate 0.025
1
4
χ inverse LTV ratio 0.25
ω Ramsey preference weight 0.5
ϑd price stickiness in D sector 0
ϑc price stickiness in ND sector 17.5
εc p r i c ee l a s t i c i t yo fd e m a n di nDs e c t o r 8
εd price elasticity of demand in ND sector 8
η elasticity of substitution btw. D and ND 1
235 The Role of Nominal Debt
We begin our analysis by focussing on the role of durable goods and nominal private debt
in shaping the optimal policy problem. To that goal, we ﬁrst analyze the optimal policy
problem in a simpliﬁed version of our model featuring no borrowing constraints. Here
we wish to understand whether the mere introduction of durable consumption can alter
the basic prescription of price stability of the baseline New Keynesian sticky price model.
We conclude that durability per se is not suﬃcient to alter that prescription. We then
proceed by introducing household heterogeneity and a role for private debt. We show
that the presence of nominal debt generates a redistributive margin for monetary policy
which induces the policy authority to optimally generate deviations from price stability.
In equilibrium, though, we ﬁnd that those deviations are small.
In both cases, we work with a simpler goods market structure, featuring only one ﬁnal
good sector. In particular, the competitive ﬁnal good producer assembles intermediate
goods purchased from a continuum of monopolistic competitive producers who run a linear
production function as in (17) and set prices optimally subject to quadratic adjustment
costs. In this simpler economy, the ﬁnal good can be costlessly transformed into both
non-durable and durable consumption. Hence the relative price between durable and non-
durable goods is always qt =1 . As a result, movements in the relative price of durables
do not aﬀect the ability of borrowing directly.
The reason for ﬁrst concentrating on this simpler case is twofold. First, it allows us
to study the role of nominal debt per se in shaping the normative conclusions of a stan-
dard New Keynesian model. Second, it allows to abstract from an additional distortion
inherent to the two-sector economy and stemming from ﬂuctuations in the relative price
of durables. In fact, with two sectors, asymmetric sectoral shocks necessarily require, as
already illustrated above, an adjustment in relative prices that cannot be brought about
eﬃciently if prices are sticky in one or both sectors.20
20See Aoki (2003) and Woodford (2003) for an analysis of optimal monetary policy in the face of
sectoral asymmetric shocks.
245.1 Benchmark: Price Stability with Durable Goods and Free
Borrowing
In order to understand the role of durable goods in the monetary policy problem, we begin
by assuming that agents can borrow and lend freely at the market interest rate. This
amounts to assuming away heterogeneity in patience rates. To obtain such benchmark
version of our model it suﬃces to evaluate the system of ﬁrst order conditions (9)-(12)
in the particular case of ψt =0 . This version of the model corresponds to a standard
representative agent sticky price model simply augmented by the introduction of durable
goods. In Appendix A we describe the structure of the competitive equilibrium in this
case and the corresponding simpliﬁed form of the optimal policy problem.
Figure 4 displays impulse responses to a productivity shock in the benchmark economy
with sticky prices, durable goods and free borrowing under the Ramsey equilibrium.
We compare two cases: (i) δ =1(full depreciation), which amounts to assuming
away durability; and (ii) δ =0 .025
1
4, which is the value for the physical depreciation
rate assumed in our baseline parameterization. It is evident that the benchmark result
of price stability under the Ramsey policy is robust to the introduction of durable goods.
With higher productivity (and income), the household would like to increase both durable
and non-durable spending. Since durables can only be accumulated slowly (recall that
the household wishes to smooth the end-of-period stock Dt and not the ﬂow of durable
spending), and since eﬃciency requires to equate the marginal utility of current consump-
tion to the expected discounted marginal value of acquiring a new durable, non-durable
consumption also moves more gradually, relative to the case δ =1 .I n ﬂation, however,
is completely stabilized in both cases. The intuition is simple. The presence of durables
does not introduce per se any additional distortion that the planner wishes to neutralize.
Hence, as it is well understood in the standard case, the planner induces the economy
to behave as if prices were completely ﬂexible. This is obtained via monetary policy
generating an expansion in demand, which induces ﬁrms to smooth markup ﬂuctuations
completely, thereby validating unchanged prices (zero inﬂation) as an equilibrium out-



































Figure 4: Responses to a Productivity Shock under the Ramsey Equilibrium in the Model
with no borrowing constraints: with durability (solid line) and without durability (δ =1 ,
dashed line).
26come.21
5.2 Optimal Inﬂation Volatility with Nominal Debt
Next we wish to consider the role of nominal private debt. In this version of the model,
we re-introduce two critical features: (i) heterogeneity (in patience rates); (ii) a collateral
constraint (on the impatient household). Still, we continue to work under the one ﬁnal
good sector model (whose details are reported in Appendix B). In this context, we wish to
understand whether the possibility of using inﬂation to aﬀect borrower’s net worth, and
therefore to marginally redistribute wealth from the saver to the borrower, may induce
the planner to deviate from a strict price stability policy.
Figure 5 illustrates how the introduction of borrowing constraints aﬀects the equilib-
rium dynamics. Once again, we show impulse responses to a rise in productivity. We
compare two alternative cases, corresponding to two values of parameter χ (solid line for
low χ and dashed line for high χ). A higher value of χ implies a lower LTV ratio and
therefore a reduced ability to collateralize the purchase of durables (hence, broadly speak-
ing, a tighter borrowing constraint). Unlike a standard permanent-income consumer, the
borrower has preferences tilted towards current consumption. Hence, in the face of higher
productivity (income), the borrower wishes to increase current consumption (reduce sav-
ing) and do so to a larger extent than the saver. In equilibrium, the two agents ﬁnd it
optimal to trade debt, with the saver ending up lending resources to the borrower, thereby
ﬁnancing the surge in consumption of the latter.
Notice that the presence of a collateral requirement (whose strength is indexed by χ)
induces a wealth eﬀect on borrower’s labor supply. In order to expand consumption, the
borrower needs to optimally balance the purchasing of new debt with an increase in labor
supply necessary to ﬁnance new collateral. The tighter the borrowing constraint (i.e., the
21The implication of durability in response to productivity shocks are relevant for another dimension,
namely the equilibrium response of employment. One can show that whereas employment tends typically
to fall in sticky price models in response to a rise in productivity (as a result of a downward shift in labor
demand, see Galí (1999)), the introduction of durables reverses the sign of that response (see Monacelli
(2006) on this particular point). This is also evident in Figure 4.










































Figure 5: Productivity Shock under the Ramsey Equilibrium: Model with Borrowing
Constraint (low vs. high Loan-To-Value Ratio 1 − χ).


















Figure 6: Optimal Response of Inﬂation to a Productivity Shock: Eﬀect of Varying Saver’s
Weight ω in Planner’s Objective.
higher χ), the more stringent the necessity of increasing labor supply. This debt-labor
supply margin is indeed a general feature of models with collateral requirements.22
In principle, since debt is predetermined in nominal terms, monetary policy can aﬀect
borrower’s net worth by altering the real value of the outstanding debt service. Hence
it is interesting to understand whether movements in inﬂation are part of the Ramsey
equilibrium. In Figure 6 we show impulse responses of inﬂation to the same productivity
shock. We report paths for inﬂation under alternative values of ω, the weight attributed
to saver’s utility in the Ramsey optimization problem. It is clear that the introduction
of nominal debt alters the conclusions of the benchmark model, in that it constitutes a
motivation for deviating from a price stability prescription.
22For instance, Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) emphasize this channel as a vehicle for business cycle
expansions/contractions. In their analysis, the reduction in equity requirements brought about by the
ﬁnancial reforms of the early eighties is a candidate theory of the so-called "great moderation" (Stock
and Watson (2002)).
















































Figure 7: Optimal Inﬂation Volatility: Eﬀect of Varying Saver’s Weight ω in Planner’s
Objective Function.
5.3 Heterogeneity
Notice that the amplitude of the inﬂation movements is decreasing in the saver’s weight
ω. Intuitively, the larger the Ramsey weight on saver’s utility, the smaller the inﬂation
redistributive motive and, supposedly, the smaller the variability in inﬂation. This con-
jecture is conﬁrmed in Figure 7, which plots the volatility of inﬂation as a function of
ω. Under the Ramsey equilibrium, larger values of ω correspond to a smaller volatility of
inﬂation.
Analyzing the eﬀects of alternative values of ω i so n ew a yt oa d d r e s st h er o l eo f
heterogeneity. Another way is to look at the eﬀect on inﬂation variability of diﬀerent
values of the borrower’s patience rate β.F o r v a l u e s o f β approaching γ,w es h o u l d









































Figure 8: Optimal Inﬂation Volatility: Eﬀect of Varying Patience Rate β.
observe a vanishing of the role of heterogeneous patience rates which is key in driving
the consumption-saving preferences of the two agents over the business cycle. Figure 8
plots optimal inﬂation volatility as a function of β.
The support of β is limited to the right by γ, which corresponds to the saver’s patience
rate. Thus we see that inﬂation variability falls for larger values of β.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
as the borrower’s patience rate converges to the one of the saver, inﬂation volatility
approaches the benchmark value of zero. In other words, when heterogeneity in patience
rates vanishes, the borrowing constraint ceases to be binding (in and in the vicinity of
the steady state), and the Ramsey equilibrium tends to mimic the optimal dynamics of
a representative agent economy with price stickiness represented in the previous section.
In that environment we have already shown that reproducing the ﬂexible price allocation
corresponds to the constrained optimum.







































Figure 9: Optimal Inﬂation Volatility: Eﬀect of Varying Price Stickiness ϑ.
5.4 Price Rigidity
It is important to emphasize that movements in inﬂation in the Ramsey equilibrium
are overall very small. Due to the presence of price stickiness, in fact, inﬂation is costly.
Hence monetary policy has to optimally balance the incentive to oﬀset the price stickiness
distortion with the one of marginally relaxing borrower’s collateral constraint via the
redistributive eﬀect of inﬂation. To explore how this tradeoﬀ is resolved, in Figure 9 we
plot the volatility of inﬂation in the Ramsey equilibrium against the degree of nominal
price stickiness ϑ. The extreme case of ϑ approaching zero corresponds to full price
ﬂexibility. Hence we see that changes in the the price stickiness parameter have a dramatic
eﬀect on the equilibrium volatility of inﬂation. In the case of ﬂexible prices, inﬂation
volatility (on an annualized basis) is around 2.5%. Yet already for small values of ϑ,t h e
volatility of inﬂation drops signiﬁcantly and remains barely positive.
This result points to a general feature shared with a large array of equilibrium busi-
32ness cycle models recently employed for optimal monetary policy analysis: namely, the
important quantitative role played by the price stickiness distortion in driving the optimal
monetary policy prescription towards stable inﬂation. One may notice the resemblance
of this result (despite the very diﬀerent environment) with the one of Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003) and Siu (2003), who analyze a joint problem of optimal monetary and ﬁscal
policy. In that case, and in the presence of nominal non-state contingent government debt,
the planner balances the incentive to generate inﬂation variability, in order to reduce the
ﬁnance cost of debt, with the cost of price variability due to price stickiness. Like here,
optimal monetary policy points to resolving the tradeoﬀ in favor of minimizing the price
stickiness distortion.
6 Durable Prices and Collateral
So far we have worked with a specialized version of our model featuring only one ﬁnal
good sector. In so doing, we have neglected any role for endogenous ﬂuctuations in the
relative price of durables in directly aﬀecting the ability of borrowing. Our normative
analysis has so far highlighted the role of two distortions. On the one hand, the planner
tries to minimize the cost of price variability due to the presence of price adjustment costs.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,w i t hn o m i n a ld e b t ,t h ep r e s e n c eo fac o l l a t e r a lr e q u i r e m e n ti n d u c e s
the planner to resort to inﬂation variability in order to marginally aﬀect the borrowing
constraint. However, the speciﬁcation of a two sector model introduces further distor-
tions. With sectoral asymmetric shocks, the equilibrium dynamics require an adjustment
in the relative price of durables. In the presence of price frictions and/or borrowing con-
straints, these relative price movements may be brought about in a way non consistent
with eﬃciency. We investigate this point below.
6.1 Ineﬃcient Movements in Relative Prices
Let us deﬁne the natural relative price of durables as the relative price prevailing with
full price ﬂexibility and free borrowing. In addition, we can deﬁne the relative price gap
33as the deviations of the relative price from that natural benchmark.
Figure 10 illustrates how the introduction of price stickiness and/or borrowing con-
straints alters the equilibrium dynamics. We plot selected variables in response to a rise
in productivity in the non-durable sector for three alternative cases: (i) the solid lines
report responses in the natural case, i.e., an economy with fully ﬂexible prices and free
borrowing; (ii) the dashed lines display the equilibrium in the presence of collateral re-
quirements only (therefore with full price ﬂexibility in both sectors); (iii) the dotted lines
display the dynamics when the two-sector model with borrowing constraints is augmented
with price stickiness in non-durables.
Consider the behavior in the natural case, which constitutes our benchmark. In the
absence of borrowing frictions and with price ﬂexibility in both sectors, the rise in pro-
ductivity in non-durables is completely absorbed via a rise in the relative price of durables
and an expenditure switching towards non-durables. Consistently, equilibrium demand
for durables is unchanged, and a rise in consumption is observed only in the non-durable
sector.
Matters are diﬀerent when a borrowing constraint is added (although still under the
assumption of full price ﬂexibility in both sectors). In this case (dashed line) the demand
for durables must rise due to the need of ﬁnancing further borrowing, with this expansion
in durable demand being ampliﬁed for larger values of the inverse loan-to-value para-
meter χ.I m p o r t a n t l y , i n a n e ﬃcient equilibrium with free borrowing and lending, the
borrower would indeed like (given his impatience) to expand borrowing to ﬁnance current
consumption, but in that case there would be no need to resort to an increase in demand
for durables. Hence we observe that the relative price of durables rises above its natural
level in the presence of collateral constraints, with this eﬀect being driven by a collateral
motive on durable demand.
Figure 10 also illustrates that the adding of stickiness in non-durable prices introduces
a further source of deviation from the natural relative price. With sticky non-durable
prices, the demand for debt rises more and so does the demand for durables, inducing a
larger increase in the relative price gap. Overall the results indicate that both frictions
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Figure 10: Responses to a Productivity Shock in the Two-Sector Model: (i) Natural
vs. (ii) Borrowing Constraints with Flexible Non-Durable Prices vs. (iii) Borrowing
Constraints with Sticky Non-Durable Prices. In these simulations monetary policy is
described by a simple Taylor rule Rt =1 .5 πc,t.
35contribute to generate ineﬃcient movements in the relative price qt from its natural level.
6.2 Collateral Eﬀects
In the two-sector model, movements in the relative price of durables are important for
they exert an endogenous eﬀect on the ability of borrowing. In this section we highlight
the importance of this transmission channel linking durable (asset) price variations to con-
sumption. We deﬁne as collateral eﬀect the acceleration on borrowing and consumption
that derives from the price of durables directly aﬀecting the right hand side of equation
(8). The intuition is akin to the "credit-cycle" phenomenon emphasized in Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005). The mechanism is simple. The rise in productivity
in the non-durable sector boosts the relative price of durables and therefore the value of
the asset that can be used as a collateral (the term qtDt in equation (8)). The resulting
increase in borrower’s net worth rises the demand for borrowing which is necessary to
ﬁnance a surge in consumption. In turn, the higher demand for collateral boosts durable
prices even further, feeding back on the value of available collateral in a self-sustained
cycle.
To illustrate this eﬀect on borrowing and consumption, we compare responses to a
productivity shock (in the non-durable sector) in two cases: with and without collateral
eﬀect. The absence of a collateral eﬀect is obtained by specifying the borrowing constraint
in the slightly modiﬁed form:
bt =( 1− χ) Dt q
ξ
t (36)
where ξ ∈ [0,1].W e c a n b r o a d l y d e ﬁne ξ as a parameter measuring the ability of the
constrained household to convert a rise in his net worth in ability of borrowing. The
case with full collateral eﬀect corresponds to ξ =1 , while the case without collateral
eﬀect corresponds to ξ small and close to zero. Figure 11 suggests that movements in
durable prices are crucial for the ampliﬁcation of the joint dynamics of borrowing and
consumption. With a collateral eﬀect at work, the rise in durable consumption and debt
is much larger relative to the case in which the collateral eﬀect is artiﬁcially shut down.
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Figure 11: Durable Prices and The Role of Collateral Eﬀect on Borrowing (Responses to
a Productivity Shock in ND Sector). In these simulations monetary policy is described
by a simple Taylor rule Rt =1 .5 πc,t.
37Importantly, the collateral eﬀect produces also an acceleration in borrower’s non-
durable consumption. The intuition works as follows. The rise in the real price of durables,
via its direct eﬀect on the collateral value, induces a fall in the marginal value of borrowing
(ψt in our model). In other words, the rise in asset prices boosts the ability of borrowing
and induces a marginal relaxation of the borrowing constraint. This implies, for the
borrower, a fall in the marginal utility of current (non-durable) consumption relative to
the option of shifting consumption intertemporally (in other words, a violation of the Euler
equation, see equation (12)), which can be validated only by a rise in current consumption.
In turn, the increased demand for borrowing further boosts durable demand and in turn
the real price of durables, inducing a circle that positively feedbacks on non-durable
consumption.
6.3 Durable Prices: Ramsey vs Taylor
In this section we investigate the behavior of the relative price of durables in the Ramsey
equilibrium. To that goal we proceed by solving the more general version of the Ramsey
problem, as outlined in (35). In particular, we wish to understand whether dampening
the volatility of durable (asset) prices should be of any concern for monetary policy in
this context. It is important to recall, as suggested above, that two are the reasons for
why the relative price of durables ﬂuctuates in deviation from its natural benchmark: (i)
the presence of a collateral requirement; (ii) price stickiness in the non-durable sector.
To this goal, we compare the dynamics in the Ramsey equilibrium with a simple











φπ > 1, φq ≥ 0 (37)
where R, πc,qcorrespond, respectively, to the steady state values of Rt, πc,t,q t.Ar u l e
such as (37) encompasses several alternative policy regimes, including the extreme cases
of: (i) strict non-durable inﬂation targeting (φπ →∞ ,h e n c e f o r t hND-targeting), and (ii)
strict durable price targeting (φq →∞ , henceforth q-targeting).
38In Figure 12 we compare the eﬀects of a productivity in the non-durable sector under
the Ramsey equilibrium with the extreme cases of ND targeting and q-targeting. One
central ﬁnding is immediately worth noticing: the amplitude of the response of the relative
price of durables in the Ramsey equilibrium is intermediate between the extreme cases
of ND targeting and q-targeting. In general, this feature of the Ramsey allocation is
common to the equilibrium behavior of the entire set of variables displayed.
Consider a strict q-targeting rule ﬁrst, and compare it with the outcome under the
Ramsey equilibrium. Evidently, this type of policy rule is largely detrimental for the
borrower. Not only it does induce a shut-oﬀ of the collateral eﬀect on borrowing outlined
above, but it hinders the necessary relative sectoral adjustment, thereby generating a
sizeable drop in the demand for collateral and borrowing, and therefore, in turn, for non-
d u r a b l ec o n s u m p t i o nb yt h eb o r r o w e r .A tt h es a m et i m e ,s i n c ed e b tf a l l si ne q u i l i b r i u m ,
this reduces the consumption-smoothing possibilities by the saver, whose consumption
volatility is in fact ampliﬁed relative to the Ramsey-optimal allocation.
Consider next a ND-targeting rule. In that case, the eﬀe c ti ss o m e w h a ts y m m e t r i c .
Relative to a Ramsey equilibrium, strict stabilization of non-durable inﬂation induces an
acceleration in the relative price of durables and in turn an ampliﬁed rise in borrowing
and durable demand. This, in turn, is also reﬂected in an ampliﬁed surge in consumption
by the borrower.
Interestingly, the Ramsey-optimal policy emerges as an intermediate case between the
two extreme targeting cases outlined above.23 In fact, the planner wishes to optimally
balance two margins. On the one hand, the incentive to partially stabilize ineﬃcient
movements in the relative price of durables due to the presence of a collateral constraint.
On the other hand, the planner has also the objective to stabilize non-durable inﬂation
due to the presence of a sticky price distortion in that sector. Hence a monetary policy
that aimed at strictly targeting non-durable inﬂation would lead to an excess volatility in
23Notice that the behavior of the relative price of durables qt is exactly symmetric in the case of
a productivity shock in the durable sector. In that case (not displayed here), qt tends to fall under
ND-targeting, while it falls less in the Ramsey equilibrium.












































Relative Price of Durables
Figure 12: Ramsey vs. Strict ND-targeting vs. Strict q-targeting: Responses to a Pro-
ductivity Shock in ND Sector.
40real durable prices and to an excess volatility in borrower’s consumption and debt.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have laid out a framework for the analysis of optimal monetary in the presence of
nominal private debt and of a collateral constraint on borrowing. The emergence of
a borrowing-lending decision in the equilibrium of our economy requires heterogeneity
between a patient and an impatient agent. At the margin, and relative to a standard
representative agent economy with price stickiness, optimal policy in this context requires
ap a r t i a lu s eo fi n ﬂation volatility with a redistributive motive. However, the fact that,
due to the presence of price stickiness, inﬂation movements are costly, heavily biases the
optimal policy prescription towards low inﬂation volatility. When durable prices have the
additional eﬀect of altering the value of the collateral and in turn the ability of borrowing,
optimal policy has a motive for partially stabilizing the relative price of durables. This
is due to the fact that the model incorporates a motive for durable goods demand (and
therefore a pressure on prices) which is strictly linked to the presence of an ineﬃcient
collateral requirement.
There are several other features that have remained unexplored in the current context
and that would deserve a more thorough normative analysis. First, detailed institu-
tional characteristics of mortgage markets should be more adequately incorporated. For
instance, the presence of an equity withdrawal margin, the possibility of resorting to mort-
gage reﬁnancing, as well as the decision of opting for a ﬂexible vs. ﬁxed rate mortgage
structure. Second, the analysis should contemplate the possibility that borrowing con-
straints may be only occasionally binding, and that, in the presence of uncertainty, the
borrower’s decisions may be driven by a precautionary saving motive. Third, one may
wish to extend this framework to the presence of collateral requirements on other forms
of spending, such as business investment. Fourth, one may think of extending the present
context to comprise the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policy. The analysis of
the latter, in particular, may fruitfully take advantage of the implications of the assumed
41heterogeneity and of the presence of a collateral constraint, in order to emphasize, in
particular, transmission channels of ﬁscal policy alternative to the typical ones embedded
in the standard neoclassical growth model.
42A Competitive Equilibrium with Durable Goods and
Free Borrowing
The (symmetric) equilibrium in the one-sector economy with free borrowing, durable
goods and sticky prices can be described (in compact form) by the following set of equa-
tions:
















































t=0, an (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium in the one-sector econ-
omy with sticky prices and durable consumption is a sequence {Nt,D t,C t,πt}∞
t=0 solv-






subject to (38), (40) and (41).
43B One (Final Good) Sector Economy
Here we brieﬂy describe the competitive equilibrium in the one-sector economy, featuring
sticky prices, heterogenous patience rates, and borrowing constraints:
• borrower’s eﬃciency condition on non-durable and durable consumption
Uc,t = Ud,t + β(1 − δ)Et {Uc,t+1} + Uc,t(1 − χ) ψt (42)


































• borrower’s ﬂow budget constraint (with Tt =0 )







• saver’s eﬃciency conditions












For any policy sequence {Rt}
∞
t=0 and stochastic process {At}∞
t=0,a n( i m p e r f e c t l y )c o m -
petitive equilibrium in the one-sector economy with sticky prices and borrowing con-
straints is a sequence
n
Nt,b t,D t, e Dt,C t, e Ct,πt
o
solving (42) - (48).
B.1 Recursive Ramsey Problem in the One-Sector Economy
Let’s deﬁne by ∆ ≡ β
ωγ1−ω the discount factor relevant from the viewpoint of the Ramsey
planner problem, where ω is the weight attached on saver’s utility. Below we describe
the form of the optimal policy program in recursive form. This is necessary because the
original problem is not time-invariant due to the fact that some constraints (such as (21))
exhibit future expectations of control variables. The recursive lagrangian problem in the






(1 − ω) β
tU(Ct,D t, Nt)+ωγ
tU(e Ct, e Dt)
i
45+∆
tλ1,t [(Uc,t(1 − (1 − χ)ψt)) − Ud,t] − ∆
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where µ ≡ ε
ε−1 is the steady state markup and πt is ﬁnal good inﬂation. This maximization
program is recursive saddle-point stationary in the ampliﬁed state space {At, Zt},w h e r e
Zt ≡ {λ1,t−1, λ2,t−1, λ3,t−1,λ 7,t−1, λ8,t−1}. The corresponding (log-linearized) set of ﬁrst
order conditions describe a time-invariant system of diﬀerence equations to the extent
that the initial condition Z0 = Z ≡
£
λ1,, λ2,, λ3,, λ7,, λ8,
¤
is added, where λj denotes the
steady state value of multiplier λj,f o rj =1 ,2,3,7,8.
C Recursive Ramsey Problem in the Two-Sector Econ-
omy
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,w h e r eZ
0
t ≡ {λ1,t−1, λ2,t−1, λ3,t−1,λ 7,t−1, λ8,t−1, λ9,t−1} and with
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